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ABSTRACT 
In this paper a basic idea of a fault-tolerant monitoring 
and decision support system will be explained. Fault detection 
is an important part of the fault-tolerant design for in-service 
monitoring and decision support systems for ships. In the paper, 
a virtual example of fault detection will be presented for a 
containership with a real decision support system onboard. All 
possible faults can be simulated and detected using residuals 
and the generalized likelihood ratio (GLR) algorithm. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The SeaSense system (Nielsen et al., 2006) has been 
installed on several containerships and navy vessels. The 
system provides an estimation of the actual sea state, 
information about the longitudinal hull-girder loading, sea-
keeping performance of the ship, and decision support on how 
to operate the ship within acceptable limits. It is able to identify 
critical forthcoming events and to give advice regarding speed 
and course changes to decrease the wave-induced loads. The 
system, sketched in Figure 1, includes a number of sensors all 
of which are used to estimate hull girder responses and predict 
wave loads, with the purpose of avoiding critical levels of hull 
stresses and ship motion(s). In this paper, it is suggested to 
improve the system by converting the system into a fault-
tolerant monitoring and decision support system. All the 
changes are on the software side, but the hardware remains the 
same. The wave elevation could be obtained using SeaSense 
system by combining the relative wave height and the vertical 
acceleration. The wave elevation has been – artificially – 
included in the sensor fault detection procedure as a virtual 
(non-existent) sensor. The sensor fault detection is performed 
using several measurements: vertical acceleration, heave, pitch, 
wave elevation and relative wave height (distance between the 
deck and the water surface). 
 
Fig. 1: Onboard sensor arrangement 
 
FAULT-TOLERANT MONITORING AND DECISION 
SUPPORT SYSTEM 
A fault is something that changes the system 
behaviour in a manner so that the system does no longer satisfy 
its purpose. The fault is the primary cause of system 
performance degradation or even loss of the system function. 
Therefore, it is very important to find the faults as quickly as 
possible and to make decisions that stop the propagation of 
their effects. The aim of these measures is to make the system 
fault-tolerant, such that the system functions after the 
appearance of a fault. A fault-tolerant monitoring and decision 
support system has the ability to react on the existence of the 
fault by adjusting its activities to the faulty behaviour of the 
system. The procedure to make a monitoring and decision 
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support system fault-tolerant consists of two steps, similar as in 
case of the fault-tolerant control system (Blanke et al., 2006): 
Fault diagnosis: The existence of faults has to be detected and 
the faults have to be identified. 
Re-design: A monitoring and decision support system has to be 
adapted to the faulty situation so that the overall system 
continues to satisfy its goal. 
Let us consider the system with the input u(t) and the output 
y(t). The pair (u,y) is called input/output pair and the set of all 
possible pairs that may occur for a given system define the 
behaviour B. The behaviour B can be defined as a subset of the 
space u x y of all possible combinations of input and output 
signals. In Figure 2 is given a graphical interpretation of the 
system behaviour. The point A represents a specific 
input/output pair that may occur for the given system and the 
point B represents a pair which is inconsistent with the system 
dynamics. The point B represents an input/output pair in the 
presence of fault. Actually, in the faulty case the system 
behaviour will move from the set B0 towards the set Bf. In the 
case of common input u, both systems, faultless (B0) and faulty 
(Bf) will give different outputs yA and yB, respectively. The 
change in the system behaviour makes the detection and 
isolation of the fault possible. However, the measurement 
information (u,y) alone is not sufficient, but a model, which 
describes the nominal system behaviour, is necessary. The 
model is a representation of the system behaviour. 
 
Fig. 2: System behaviour. 
The models describe the behaviour of the faultless and the 
faulty system. They restrict the possible input/output pairs to 
those that appear in the behaviour B0 or Bf. With other words, 
models are constraints on the signals u and y that appear in the 
system. The model of the system in the presence of a specific 
fault shows how the system output y is affected by this fault. In 
fault diagnosis both the input u and the output y are known and 
it is checked whether the input/output pair belongs to the 
specific behaviour. In summary, the diagnostic principle can be 
described as follows (Blanke et al., 2006): 
For given models that describe the behaviour Bf of the system 
subjected to the faults , test whether the input/output pair 
(U,Y) satisfies the relation 
. 
Fault detection: If the input/output pair is inconsistent with the 
behaviour B0 of the faultless system 
 
Then a fault is known to have occurred. 
Fault isolation and identification: If the input/output pair is 
consistent with the behaviour Bf , 
. 
Then a fault f may have occurred. 
We can notice that fault detection is possible without any 
information about the behaviour of the faulty system. Fault 
detection uses only a model of the nominal system. It is 
sufficient to identify deviations of the current system behaviour 
from the nominal behaviour. On the other hand, fault isolation 
and identification are not possible without information about 
the faulty system. Therefore, the fault model has to be known. 
The fault diagnosis can be divided in three steps on the basis of 
accuracy as mentioned before: 
Fault detection: Decide whether or not a fault has occurred. 
This step determines the time at which the system is subjected 
to some fault. 
Fault isolation: Find in which component a fault has occurred. 
This step determines the location of the fault. 
Fault identification and fault estimation: Identify the fault 
and estimate its magnitude. This step determines kind of fault 
and its severity. 
In the fault diagnosis the sensor measurement y is compared 
with the analytically computed value . Therefore, the 
consistency of the system with the model can be tested at every 
time t by: 
 
Where r(t) is called a residual. In the faultless case, the residual 
is close to zero. It is not exactly zero, due to measurement noise 
and model uncertainties. In the presence of fault, the residual 
has some specific, non-vanishing value. 
Diagnostic algorithms for continuous-variable systems 
generally consist of two components; cf. Figure 3 (Blanke et 
al., 2006): 
Residual generation: The model and the input/output pair are 
used to determine residuals, which describe the degree of 
consistency between the system  and the model behaviour. 
Residual evaluation: The residual is evaluated in order to 
detect, isolate and identify faults. 
 
u x y 
. A 
. B 
B0 Bf 
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Fig. 3: Fault detection and isolation 
The re-design considers the problem of changing the system 
structure after a fault has occurred in the plant. The aim is to 
provide the capability of the system to satisfy its purpose after 
occurrence of the fault. Two principal ways of re-design have 
to be distinguished, fault accommodation and reconfiguration: 
Fault accommodation (Off-line solution): Fault 
accommodation means to adapt the parameters to the 
dynamical properties of the faulty system. The input and output 
of the plant remain the same as for faultless case. The fault 
accommodation is based on predesigned systems, each of 
which has been selected off-line for a specific fault. This 
method is fast and can meet strong real-time constraints. 
However, re-design has to be made for all possible faults before 
the system is operative. 
Reconfiguration (On-line solution): If fault accommodation is 
impossible, the complete monitoring and decision support 
system has to be reconfigured. In this case we have a new 
system configuration where alternative input and output signals 
are used. Those signals are selected according to the faults. A 
new system has to be designed on-line. Reconfiguration is 
necessary in case of sensor failure. 
 
EXAMPLE: A CONTAINERSHIP WITH DECISION 
SUPPORT SYSTEM 
For sensor fault detection, there is as mentioned a need 
to find physical relations between measured values. The 
SeaSense system has at its disposal several measurements: 
vertical acceleration, heave, pitch, wave elevation and relative 
wave height. The basic ship motions are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Fig. 4: Basic ship motions 
 
For the actual sea state estimation (Nielsen et al., 2006), it is 
sufficient to use three different ship motions. Therefore, the 
fault-tolerant approach is convenient for implementation in our 
case. 
 
Fig. 5: Heave and pitch motion 
 
The relation between different ship motions are given by the 
following set of constraints (see Figure 5): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Residual Generator 
Residual Evaluation 
Measured input Measured output 
Residual signals 
Assumption about faulty 
components 
Z
Y
X
(wave)
(pitch)
z (heave)
x (surge)
y (sway)
(roll)
(yaw)
CG
CG z
zb= z + (L/2) sin
sb= zb - 
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Where: 
 
 Vertical acceleration on the bow 
z Heave 
 Pitch 
sb 
Relative bow motion (distance between the 
deck on the bow and the wave) 
 Wave elevation 
L 
Length of the ship (it is assumed that centre of 
gravity is on the midship section). 
 
Symbols c1...c4 denote constraints, d1…d6 derivatives and 
m1…m5 measurements. 
For more information about constraints, see (Bhattacharyya, 
1978). The set of variables in a system are separated into the 
sets X (unknown) and K (known). 
Known variables:  
K={y1,y2,y3,y4,y5} 
 
Unknown variables: 
  
 
In order to extract the residuals, available for fault diagnosis, 
one may apply an analysis of the structure of the constraints 
and the unknown variables. While there are several ways to 
deduct analytical redundancy relations for nonlinear systems, 
analysis is particularly simple. Algorithms exist for matching 
unknown variables to constraints and find the non-matched 
constraints that are the basis for minimal structurally 
overdetermined sets that are used to determine the possible 
diagnosis algorithms (Krysander et al., 2008). The constraints 
may be matched to the unknown variables as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is given one complete matching on the unknown variables, 
three constraints remains unmatched. Each of these gives basis 
for a residual generator that can check the consistency of the 
constraints. If deviation from normal behavior should occur, 
this will result in one or more of the residuals being different 
from zero. The residuals (in schematic form) are: 
 
r1: , that is, after substitution of the 
unknown variables 
r1:  
 
r2: , that is, after eliminating unknown 
variables 
r2:  
r3: , that is 
r3:  
 
 
It is easier to match the unknown variables using a matching 
table (Blanke et al., 2006). The matching table for the specific 
system is shown in Table 1. 
 
/                
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
                 
Table 1: Matching table 
 
In the paper, residuals r1 and r2 will be discussed only, because 
from the third residual it is not possible to obtain new 
information about the system. 
The system contains five sensors. Therefore, it is possible to 
have the following faults: 
 
f1- vertical acceleration, 
f2- heave,  
f3- pitch, 
f4- wave elevation and 
f5- relative wave height. 
 
The fault signatures are shown in Table 2. The symbol i denotes 
a fault isolation and the symbol d denotes a fault detection. 
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/ f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 
r1 x x x   
r2  x x x x 
 1 3 3 2 2 
 i d d d d 
Table 2: Fault signatures 
 
All five column vectors are different from zero, and thus all 
faults are detectable. The fault f1 has a unique signature and 
therefore this fault is isolable. As a result of the analysis, the 
following set has been obtained: 
 
Detectable faults: f2, f3, f4, f5 
Undetectable faults: - 
Isolable faults: f1 
 
The residuals can be expressed in the analytic form as: 
r1:  
r2:  
 
In the following, simulations of ship motions in waves and the 
residuals r1 and r2 are presented. The simulations of ship 
motions in waves are similar to (Nielsen, 2007). The referred 
ship is a containership (length L= 275 m, breath B= 40 m, 
draught T= 12 m), which sails at speed of 10 m/s. Residuals 
have been simulated using Simulink
®
 (Dabney et al., 2004). 
The simulations are performed during a time period of 1000 
seconds. The simulations of pitch, heave, vertical acceleration 
and wave elevation are shown in figures 6-9. 
 
Fig. 6: Pitch 
 
Fig. 7: Heave 
 
Fig. 8: Vertical acceleration 
 
Fig. 9: Wave elevation (midship section) 
 
Residuals r1 and r2 in case of no faults are shown in Figures 10 
and 11. Both residuals indicate the absence of the fault. 
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Fig. 10: Residual r1 (no faults). 
 
Fig. 11: Residual r2 (no faults). 
 
In the following, the residuals in the presence of faults will be 
presented and discussed. As examples of fault scenarios, the 
faults will be created by adding an extra signal to the sensor 
output during time interval between 100 seconds and 500 
seconds. After 500 seconds, extra signals are removed. The 
configuration is summarized in Table 3. 
 
Fault Type Units Value Time 
interval [s] 
f1 vertical 
acceleration 
m/s
2 
0.5 100-500 
f2 heave m 0.5 100-500 
f3 pitch rad 0.05 100-500 
f4 wave elevation m 0.5 100-500 
f5 relative wave 
height 
m 0.5 100-500 
Table 3: Simulated faults. 
 
Residuals can be directly evaluated by the GLR (generalized 
likelihood ratio) test. The GLR test is a useful tool in fault 
detection. The GLR algorithm relies on the log-likelihood ratio 
of an observation z. Important steps in GLR algorithm are   
selection of threshold h, decision function g calculation and the 
construction of the alarm diagram using selected threshold and 
calculated decision function. The GLR decision function can be 
calculated (Blanke et al., 2006): 
 
Where: 
z- observation, 
k- present time instant, 
j- time instant of the fault occurrence (hypothetical), 
M- time horizon, 
- variance, 
µ0- mean. 
 
The main advantage of the GLR test is that it links the test 
threshold with the probability of false alarm and the probability 
of correct detection. Another advantage of this technique is that 
it can estimate the jump amplitude and the fault appearing time 
(Peng et al., 1997). More information regarding GLR algorithm 
and an alternative approach, which is less time-consuming, can 
be found in (Nikiforov, 2001). 
The residual r1 in the presence of the fault f1 and results of the 
GLR test, e.g. decision function and alarm are given in Figure 
12. 
 
Fig. 12: Residual r1, fault f1= 0.5 m/s
2
 and GLR test (decision 
function and alarm). 
 
By using the GLR algorithm it is possible to detect a fault f1. 
The alarm diagram is constructed using a decision function and 
an appropriate threshold. It is possible to notice small delays in 
the fault detection. The delays in detecting the beginning and 
the end of the interval of the presence of fault are due to the 
relatively big noise. Therefore, it has been necessary to 
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implement a relatively high horizon M which produces the 
detection delay. It can be handled by implementing a filter. 
 
In case of the fault f2, we have both residuals at our disposal. 
However, the best result has been obtained using residual r2 
(Figure 13). The fault f2 can be detected using the decision 
function and the alarm diagram. It is easy to notice that the 
system is in an alarm condition in the time interval between 100 
seconds and 500 seconds, which is exactly the interval of the 
presence of a fault.  
 
Fig. 13: Residual r2, fault f2= 0.5 m and GLR test (decision 
function and alarm). 
 
Also, in case of the fault f3 it is possible to use both residuals, 
but like in the case of the fault f2 better results are obtained 
using the second residual. The residual in the presence of a 
fault f3 and the results of the GLR test are shown in Figure 14. 
The fault f3 is detected. 
 
Fig. 14: Residual r2, fault f3= 0.05 rad and GLR test (decision 
function and alarm). 
 
From the analytical expression of the residual r2 it can be seen 
that the faults f4 and f5 will create similar effects on the 
residual. That is, the residual r2 and the results of the GLR test 
will be the same in both cases. Therefore, the results for the 
fault f4 will be presented only. 
The residual r2 in the presence of a fault f4 and the results of the 
GLR test are presented in Figure 15. 
 
Fig. 15: Residual r2, fault f4= 0.5 m and GLR test (decision 
function and alarm). 
 
The residual r2 is very sensitive to faults of sensors y4 and y5. 
The fault presence is obvious and the GLR test has also easily 
detected the fault. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper the basic idea of a fault-tolerant monitoring 
and decision support system has been presented. The onboard 
sensor fault detection for monitoring and decision support 
systems has been demonstrated by a practical example. The 
faults have been created by adding an extra signal to the sensor 
output and the sensitivity of the residuals to the sensor fault has 
been investigated. The residuals have been evaluated by GLR 
test. All the faults have been detected and the implementation 
of the fault-tolerant design has been justified. 
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